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Since the first appearance of The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche has arguably proved to be amongst the most 
influential intellectual_~ upon European artistic practice. Indeed, four 
musicians with strong Nietzschean traces who immediately come to 
mind are Richard Strauss (Also Sprach Zarathustra, 1895) and Gustav 
Mahler (Symphony NO.3 in D Minor, 1895/1896), Frederick Delius 
(A Mass of Lift, 1904/1905) and Arnold Schoenberg (Der Wanderer in 
Eight Songs, Opus 6, 1903/1905). Yet this paper is not concerned with 
the vicissitudes of Nietzsche's influence upon musicians over the last 
four or five generations, let alone with the influence of a Richard 
Wagner or a Georges Bizet upon him, nOf, for that matter, with his 
own attempts at composition. 
The Birth of Tragedy , in common with Nietzsche's other publications, 
verges upon the potentially intimidating. Even on a cursory reading, it 
presents its readers with significant problems of how they are to orient 
themselves. Not only do we confront his visionary, and at times abstruse, 
concerns with ancient Hellenic and contemporary European culture, 
but we also need to adjust again and again to his rhetorical, and at times 
self-conscious, strategies. As Nietzsche himself was to acknowledge in 
his 1886 '1\.ttempt at a Self-Criticism", his text is one "without the will to 
logical cleanliness, very convinced and therefore disdainful of proof, 
mistrustful even of the propriety of proof". 1 Indeed, commentators of 
more analytical persuasion have long warned us of Nietzsche's 
propensity for playing the most basic of notions through a conceptual 
concertina, compressing and billowing the meanings of terms "in part to 
crack the habitual grip on thought in which language holds US".2 
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Furthermore, for readers either familiar with or fresh to Nietzsche, 
there is the difficulty of deciding whether he should be principally 
read in light of the intellectual idiom and aesthetic debates of his fore-
bears-Kant and Schiller, Hegel and Schopenhauer to name but the 
most obvious-or whether he should mainly be read in light of his 
published works from The Birth to Ecce Homo. In either case, that 
decision seems to rest in the final analysis upon whether we regard 
Nietzsche's writings as possessing an underlying, possibly evolving 
system of thought or not.3 Yet for all that, this paper is not concerned 
with an attempt to read Nietzsche historically, nor to trace his 
intellectual development through published and unpublished writings. 
Instead, we shall adopt the more modest aim of critically exploring 
Nietzsche's conception of music as specifically revealed by The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. Because it is a work conflating aesthetic, 
metaphysical, and psychological issues from its very opening paragraph, 
we shall also need to confront certain complications peculiar to the 
transcendental approach to the arts. These same complications, in tum, 
appear to compel a marked tension in Nietzsche between 
('~pollonian'') appeals to representation and ("Dionysian') appeals to 
transformation as a means of grappling with the metaphysical pwposes 
of the arts. However, even within this limited compass, it should be 
stated that we shall not be assessing the extent of, say, Schopenhauer's 
idealist influence nor providing a corrective to Nietzsche's classical 
scholarship nor adjudicating amongst the successive interpretations of 
Nietzsche by recent theories, ranging from the ethnographical and the 
existential to the psychoanalytic and the deconstructionist.4 Rather, we 
shall pay particular attention to the way in which music and other 
artfonns that Nietzsche categorises as tragic are grounded by the 
way in which he develops the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction. 
Although adopting a different tack from those listed above, we, too, 
shall be driven to ask whether his conception, as evocative and 
influential as it has proved to be, is not riddled with "ambiguity" and 
"confusion".5 This question will initially be tackled from two points 
of view. Firstly, does the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction slide 
between different kinds of analogies? Secondly, does it similarly shift 
between unrelated types of tendencies? Next, when tracing how 
Nietzsche applies the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction to music, we 
shall find him turning from any construal of it as a representation of 
experience to a transformation of experience that includes the 
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transcendent. Finally, how the sheer metaphysical weight Nietzsche 
sought to impose upon music and the tragic arts can be justifiably 
supported, will form the concluding theme of this paper. 
I 
Section One of The Birth of Tragedy immediately introduces Nietzsche's 
widely disseminated Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, the first of 
several, seemingly polarised terms, including "appearance" and 
"reality", "individuation" and "oneness", "the imageless" and "the 
symbolic" amongst others. The variable relationship between states 
of affairs signified by both terms of the distinction is used to 
account for Hellenic and European artistic development in general 
whereas a momentary balance between the two is used to account 
for the artistic pinnacle assigned to Aeschylus' and Sophocles' 
tragic dramas in particular. More germane to our concerns is 
Nietzsche's opinion that the distinction is to be perceived "not 
merely by logical inference", "not, to be sure, in concepts", but is 
nonetheless to be revealed by "the intensely clear figures of their 
gods ... the two art deities"-Apollo and Dionysius.6 In the closing 
Section of the work, this appeal to a non-inferential mode of 
reckoning is made more explicit when Nietzsche rhapsodises over 
the "power of transfiguration" wrought by both the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian "art drives" whose effects we "should be able to feel 
most assuredly by means of intuition".7 The Apollonian-Dionysian 
distinction, whilst construed as two antithetical or opposing 
"tendencies", is then explicated analogously as "the separate art 
worlds of dreams and intoxication" respectively.8 Dreams, supposedly 
functioning as the prerequisite of the plastic arts, notably sculpture, 
archi tecture, and painting, are characterised by "the immediate 
understanding" of their forms and images which afford the 
"aesthetically sensitive" individual "an interpretation of life" by 
virtue of his or her being "a close and ~illing observer". 9 By 
contrast, in intoxication or r~pture (Rausch), "everything subjective 
vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness", into an ecstasy or 
paroxysm associated with music and dance, where one "is no longer 
an artist" as dreamers can be, but where, in effect, one "has become 
a work of art".l0 These opposing tendencies are re-construed by 
Nietzsche in Section Two: 
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as artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself, 
without the mediation of the human artist-energies in which 
nature's art impulses are satisfied in the most immediate 
and direct way-first in the image world of dreams, whose 
completeness is not dependent upon the intellectual 
attitude or the artistic culture of any single being; and 
then as intoxicated reality, which likewise does not heed 
the single unit, but even seeks to destroy the individual 
and redeem him by a mystic feeling of oneness. I I 
Pausing at this initial stage of Nietzsche's polemic, we may detect 
a number of manoeuvres which more or less rapidly reveal them-
selves to be characteristic of the text as a whole. However, two in 
particular-the appeal to analogies and the appeal to tendencies 
-will form the centre of our attention here given their impact upon 
the means of understanding the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction 
within which music is rooted. 
First of all, Nietzsche overtly develops his view of the distinction 
by means of analogy. But what kind of analogy or analogies does he 
employ, especially in the case where the Dionysian is predicated of 
"the primordial unity" said to exist "beneath" the "mere appearance" 
of "our being,,?12 It would seem that two analogies in particular 
-the "projective" and the "existential" to borrow Dorothy 
Emmet's terms13-are ambiguously exploited by Nietzsche. In the 
first case, Dionysian experiences (of the kind associated with the 
initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries or the medieval dancers of St 
John and St Vitus) enable Nietzsche to postulate the nature of the 
transcendent state of reality which supposedly cannot be known 
from Apollonian experiences alone. But since the Dionysian, by 
definition, is tantamount to a holistic identification with the 
transcendent without the intervention of individualising concepts, 
then knowledge of its nature is only obtained by assuming that 
Dionysian experiences have a representational character which can 
form the content of an '~pollonian dream-inspiration". 14 However, 
to compare a phenomenon-a Dionysian experience-with some-
thing which is not regarded as a phenomenon-the transcendent 
state of reality-leaves us with an appeal to the imagination, to a 
projection from the experiential (or phenomenal) to the 
transcendent (or noumenal) which, in strict terms, cannot be 
known. 
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Given the apparent epistemic impasse of projective analogies, 
perhaps we could more generously reinterpret Nietzsche's approach 
in terms of an existential analogy. Here, the analogy might be 
depicted as the expression of a relationship to something which is in 
part experienced and in part not experieJjlced. In' other words, the 
transcendent state of reality-whether caIJed "the inmost ground of 
the world" or "the primal unity", "a hidden subStratum of suffering 
and of knowledge, revealed ... by the Dionysicin" or quite simply 
"truth"lS-should not be taken to mean something beyond or above, 
as it were, the range of our experience, whether Dionysian or Apollonian. 
Rather, the transcendent is something other than ourselves or our 
minds to which, during Dionysian experiences, we can be said to be 
related. In effect, Dionysian experiences provide an indirect testimony 
by which Nietzsche believes the character of the transcendent can be 
evoked. Yet, undermining Nietzsche's reliance upon the existential 
analogy is that, on the one hand, the testimony of such experiences is 
one that he often asks us to "picture" or "imagine", and, on the other 
hand, his belief in the "cosmic symbolism" of music is one which 
symbolises "a sphere which is beyond and prior to aU phenomena".16 
Could there be another form of metaphysical analogy which 
best describes Nietzsche's practice? At first glance, it might seem 
tempting to suggest that hypothetical analogies, no matter how 
provisional, suit his purposes, except that they normally appear to be 
coupled with demands for verification. More specifically, such analogies 
presuppose that the nature of the world as a whole can be drawn by 
means of selected phenomena within it, including music, yet the 
world as a whole, not being an object of experience, makes the 
hypothesis unverifiable. Nor, as Hans Vaihinger has long since noted, 
are hypothetical analogies totally akin to fictional constructs which 
posit a possibility for the purposes of argument without implying 
that such a possibility need exist. 17 Again, nothing in Nietzsche 
indicates that he merely entertains the Apollonian-Dionysian 
distinction and the place of music within it as an expedient construct, 
let alone a probable one. Last but not least, the possibility remains 
that Nietzsche uses analogies non-argumentatively. In an effort to 
make the ineffable more familiar, if not more vivid, Nietzsche often 
resorts to such anecdotes as the pronouncement of Silenus (firstly 
conveyed in Section Three of The Birth of Tragedy). In other words, it 
is not always easy to determine when Nietzsche slides from 
argumentative to non-argumentative uses of analogy. Nor is it 
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immediately obvious what we are to understand by 'experience', 
which, for Nietzsche here, includes experience of that which 
seemingly transcends experience. 
Compounding the elusiveness of Nietzsche's use of metaphysical 
analogy as interpreted above is his accompanying description of the 
Apollonian-Dionysian distinction in terms of opposed t~ndencies. 
For Nietzsche to classify the so-called artistic energies of nature as 
antithetical tendencies as such disguises two logically unconnected 
cases: the directional tendency towards or from something and the 
tendency to do or to be something. IS When accounting for the 
manner in which the "immediate art-states" or "art impulses" of nature 
developed amongst the ancient Greeks and, more particularly, under-
scored "that relation of the Greek artist to his archetypes", 19 Nietzsche 
appears to vacillate between both kinds of tendencies. On the one 
hand, by attributing one set of characteristics to the Apollonian 
impulse or force and another opposing set to the Dionysian, Nietzsche 
appears to be highlighting the different directional tendencies of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian. On the other hand, he also seems to be 
saying something about what Dionysian behaviour from Babylonian 
times onwards tends to do without exception, namely, to unleash "the 
most savage natural instincts". 20 However, exceptionless tendencies 
which qualify the extent rather than the frequency of those tendencies 
do not make sense, since the latter, not the fonner, admits of degrees, 
and Nietzsche, moreover, appears to be focused upon the issue of 
extent given his concern with "the deepest roots of the Hellenic 
nature".21 Admittedly, ambiguity arises when the extent and the 
frequency of a tendency are conflated, as in cases where it might be 
said Dionysians invariably tend to unleash their frenzy on all occasions. 
However, if Dionysian.s always unleash their frenzy on all occasions, it 
seems odd to assert that the explanation lies in the Dionysians having a 
tendency to do so. The objection here is that exceptionless tendencies 
to do something can become all too easily converted into rather 
mysterious causal explanations of the powers of nature. 
A further difficulty arising from Nietzsche's view of the Apollonian-
Dionysian distinction in terms of opposite tendencies lies in his 
propensity to characterise such directional tendencies as 'impulses' 
or 'forces'. Such is the case when, according to Nietzsche, both forces 
were "reconciled", thereby enabling the resultant "transfiguration" to 
become "an artistic phenomenon".22 Although Athenian tragedy may 
be subject to two equal and opposed forces or impulses at play during 
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various artistic epochs, it does not inevitably have two tendencies. 
It does not have a tendency to shift towards the Apollonian and a 
tendency to shift towards the Dionysian which happen to cancel 
each other or which happen to combine and thereby produce a third 
tendency. In the face of two equal and opposing forces, there is no 
tendency to shift one way or the other hecause, unlike physical forces 
continuing to act upon a material object, the t\vo tendencies have 
disappeared, a point basically ignored by The Birth of Tragedy . Tendencies 
do not function in the same way as forces or impulses do although we 
often describe the effects of impulses or forces as tendencies. 
II 
So far, we have concentrated our attention upon the kind of 
ambiguities in his appeals to analogies and tendencies which can 
make a reading of Nietzsche so difficult. At the same time, we have 
attemgted to open his highly influential Apollonian-Dionysian 
distinction to critical inspection, as a prelude to disclosing some-
thing of his conception of music.The latter properly emerges when 
the Apolloruan-Dionysian distinction is no longer exclusively applied 
to nature. So, let us now highlight four major perspectives connected 
with music taken by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. 
First of all, with the introduction of the I?ionysian strain in Hellenic 
culture, the "essence of nature", claims Nietzsche, could be 
"expressed symbolically". 23 This, in turn, supposedly requires "a new 
world of symbols", namely, "the entire symbolism of the body ... not 
the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech but the whole 
pantomime of dancing" whereupon "the other symbolic powers 
suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmics, 
dynamics, and harmony". 24 At this early stage, it might be said, 
Nietzsche signals a relatively uncontroversial realisation that not 
only can there be shifts in what is symbolised, but also in how it may 
be symbolised. And this, in turn, allows him implicitly to contrast 
his stance to that of Aristotle, not so much in denying artistic 
processes as -an "imitation of nature", as in denying Aristotle's 
naturalistic conception of nature. More controversially, however, if 
Dionysian music is being assigned symbolic powers, then included 
amongst those powers is its capacity to engender other forms of 
producing symbols (subsequently asserted to be lyric poetry, then 
tragic myth and drama).25 Yet how can music, a "cosmic symbolism",26 
simultaneously "give birth to ... tragic myth ... which expresses 
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Dionysian knowledge in symbols"?27 Is "birth" here little more than 
a metaphor for music as an artistic or an experiential yet non-
reciprocal inspiration for the non-musical? 
A second perspective emerges when the appeal to the symbolism 
of music and dance is eventually contrasted with the representational 
capacities, so to speak., of lyric poetry and the poet. Here, poetic 
processes provide a partial intimation of the Dionysian insofar as, 
"before the act of creation", Schiller, for instance, found himself 
encountering not a "series of images in a causal arrangement, but 
rather a musical mooel'. 28 Nietzsche finds this psychological state of 
the lyric poet explicable since, "as a Dionysian artist he has identified 
himself with the primal unity, its pain and contradiction" and, 
presuming that "music has been correctly termed a repetition and a 
recast of the world, we may say that he produces the copy of this 
primal unity as music" (although "this music reveals itself to him 
again as a symbolic dream image", as "a second mirroring"2~. Though 
removed from transcendent reality, the lyric poet is nonetheless 
closer to the Dionysian than any other artist, in that his "images ... 
are nothing but his very self". 30 To that extent, the poet's psycho-
poetic images are in effect various projections of himself This 
"self" of the lyric poet, Nietzsche asserts, "is not the same as that of 
the waking, empirically real man" nor as that of the egocentric "sub-
jectively willing and desiring man". 31 The reason given is that such an 
artist, even if he has used himself as the ostensible subject of his 
work, "has already been released from his individual will, and has 
become, as it were, the medium" fOf "the one truly existent 
subject"-that "eternal self resting at the basis of things"?2 Only in 
this heightened state of approaching that of the creator of the world 
can Nietzsche's hypothetical lyric genius in his act of creation be said 
to "know anything of the eternal essence of art", and only in this 
state is he transformed: "at once subject and object, at once poet, 
actof, and spectator". 33 Artistic representation or symbolism, from 
this second perspective, has now been extended from the artist and 
artefact to a transcendent reality as if the psychological and the 
metaphysical domains were analogously and unarguably connected. 
At the same time, artist and (as conceded in Section Six of The Birth) 
artefact alike undergo significant modification in the attempt to 
realise the transcendent. The modification would not only involve the 
perceivable properties of the work, but the intentions of the poet also. 
In addition, although more by implication, there is the recognition of 
1.4. 
R.A. Goodrich 
the same by appropriately attuned performers and spectators. 
In other words, Nietzsche does not confine artistic representation or 
symbolism to an individual's apprehension; rather, it belongs to a 
communal context. 
Section Six of The Birth of Tragedy contains a< third major refer-
ence to music where its interaction with poetry becomes a focus of 
attention. Nietzsche has specifically in mind how the language of 
song may be extended to the point of imitating music. Indeed, he 
claims to have depicted "the only possible relation between poetry 
and music" as one where "the word, the image, the concept here 
seeks an expression analogous to music,,?4 However, this relationship 
is an asymmetrical one: 
music itself ... does not need the image and the concept, 
but merely endures them as accompaniments. The poems 
of the lyrist can express nothing that did not already lie 
hidden ... in the music that compelled him to figurative 
speech. Language can never adequately render the cosmic 
symbolism of music, because music stands in symbolic 
relation to ... primal unity, and therefore symbolizes a 
sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. 
Rather, all phenomena, compared with it, are merely 
symbols: hence language, as the organ and symbol of 
phenomena, can never by any means disclose the inner-
most heart of music .... 35 
Without detouring into his unpublished writings about the 
presuppositional relationship between music and language,36 it 
might be maintained here that Nietzsche gives voice to the broadly 
contemporaneous theme-common to a Hanslick and a Gurner7 
-that music, unlike poetry, cannot be translated into another 
representational medium since its (metaphysical) content can only 
be articulated by music itself Perhaps this sheer untranslatability of 
music allows Nietzsche to scorn those whose merely contemplative 
or passive response might view music as typical of the elusiveness, 
indeterminancy, or obscurity of the arts resistant to description. Yet 
even if it were true that dithyrambic music, shorn completely of 
images and concepts and erasing any sense of self, symbolises a 
transcendental sphere, it does not follow that so experiencing it 
precludes a more or less apt, a more or less figurative description of 
the experience of that music as Nietzsche himself demonstrates 
throughout The Birth ofTragedy.38 
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In the context of the physical disposition of ancient Greek 
theatre, a fourth set of assertions about music returns us to the 
matter of the representational connection borne by the chorus in 
terms both of its spectators and of how it "generates" the Dionysian 
vision, "speaking of it with the entire symbolism of d~, tone, and 
words".39 Nietzsche particularly emphasises the distinctiveness of 
the dithyrambic chorus as "a community of unconscious actors who 
consider themselves and one another transformed", a transformation 
which is "the presupposition of all dramatic art".40 Both the 
dithyrambic composer and the choral member have transfiguration 
in common: the composer being one who "feel{s} the urge to transform 
himself and to speak out of other bodies and souls" and the 
Dionysian choral actor being one who "sees himself as a satyr, and as 
a satyr, in turn, he sees the god, which means that in his metamorphosis 
he beholds another vision outside himself".41 As befits the earlier 
articulation of the Apollonian-Dionysian distinction, both composer 
and choral actor are contrasted with the rhapsodist and the painter 
neither of whom becomes "fused with his images," but, rather, "sees 
them outside himself as objects of contemplation" .42 
Clearly, by now, we can detect a marked shift in Nietzsche's 
conception of art and representation derived from his prior construal 
of music. Taken from the point of view of its creation and enactment, 
an increasing emphasis falls, in the words of Richard Schacht, upon 
"the transfiguring character of art.,,43 As a result, the transcendent 
force or impulse "which calls art into being, as the complement as 
consummation of existence" is paradoxically seen by Nietzsche as 
"the cause of the Olympian world" which the Greeks then "made use 
of as a transfiguring mirror". 44 Similarly, towards the end of his tract 
when focusing upon the nature of tragic myth and its dissonances, he 
observes that it "participates fully in this metaphysical intention of 
art to transfigure", immediately after reminding his readers that "art 
is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but rather a meta-
physical supplement of the reality of nature, placed beside it for its 
overcoming".45 Precisely in what way art can be both a product of the 
"artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself" that sees it 
embodying the same Apollonian-Dionysian "art-impulses of nature" 
as well as a distinctive, separate "metaphysical supplement of the 
reality of nature" by which we can supposedly overcome nature's 
revelation of "the horror or absurdity of existence" remains 
challenging to say the least.46 
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III 
During the foregoing section, we have briefly detailed the way in 
which Nietzsche has gradually turned froID, dealing with latent and 
actual artforms as representations pure and. simple under the heading 
of such related concepts as copy and image, imitation and mirroring, 
representation and symboL In its place, Of, more. precisely, alongside 
this conceptual cluster, has emerged another set pertaining to the 
notion of transformation or transfiguration. Now even if we were to 
contend that it is altogether far more justifiable to see Nietzsche as 
ultimately extolling transformation as the means of characterising 
the metaphysical dimension of music and cognate tragic arts, would 
such a thesis prove cogent? In large part, the answer has to contend 
with the difficulties confronting Nietzsche's belief that art of a 
particular kind actually discloses the transcendent. It is with this 
issue that we shall bring this paper to a close. 
How can the transformations wrought by art, especially music and 
tragic drama, reveal the transcendent state of reality, when the 
transcendent, on Nietzsche's account, is "beyond" or "beneath" 
possible experience (and not, in the Kantian manner, those a priori 
conditions by which experience is made possible4)? If, by defmition, 
the transcendent cannot be experienced, momentarily or otherwise, is 
Nietzsche committed to the view that we only seem to experience the 
transcendent, or, alternatively, that it only seems that the transcendent 
is revealed, Of, less directly, intimated in some manner?48 To all intents 
and purposes, Nietzsche opposes the notion of seeming experience, if 
for no other reason than the appeals to his own, actual experience. But 
for him to claim, in effect, that he has experienced something of the 
transcendent when experiencing particular works of art-notably, the 
third act of Richard Wagner's Tristan und Isolde (1859) as Section 21 of 
The Birth of Tragedy reveals-leads to outright falsehood, since, if the 
transcendent is outside experience, whatever he purportedly exp-
erienced could not have been an experience of the transcendent. 
What of the other two notions: that of music as a seeming revelation 
of the transcendent or as a seeming intimation of the transcendent? 
Here, to understand what music "seems", it appears we need an 
explanation of what it is that it seems. To adapt an example from 
Nietzsche himself, if Aristophanes seems "a dissolute, mendacious 
Alcibiades of poetry",49 then what Aristophanes seems is largely 
premised upon understanding what is meant by "a dissolute, mendacious 
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Alcibiades of poetry". Without understanding what this expression 
signifies outside its occurrence in the above example, the explanation 
of what Aristophanes 'seems' appears to be radically incomplete. 
However, an objection along these lines may not bring the issue at 
hand any closer to resolution, because a definition of transcendence 
is being sought well before an insight into whether or how music can 
be a seeming revelation or intimation of it. 
Perhaps another approach to analysing what it is for music to 
intimate or reveal the transcendent is to return to the general case of 
what it is for the arts to represent anything. Here, of course, we face 
Plato's question in The Republic of whether or not, in experiencing an 
artwork, we experience what the work represents.50 To hear a call of 
a bird is to experience something in the way that to hallucinate it is 
not actually to hear and thereby experience it. Hence we may ask, in 
cases where the object and the medium of representation are closely 
aligned, how far do hearing and hallucinating indicate what it is to 
hear a call of a bird, represented in, say, the first movement of 
Symphony No. I in D Major (1888/1889) by Gustav Mahler? Or, less 
controversially, to see a woman at 'a window is to experience some-
thing in a way that to dream it, for example, is not to see and thereby 
experience it. And the question again, therefore, is how far do 
seeing and dreaming illuminate what it is to see a woman at a 
window, represented in, say, the painting of the same name by Edgar 
Degas (1871/1872) housed at the Courtauld Institute? To say that both 
representational cases involve the imagination simply recasts the 
issue as one of asking whether imagining is more similar to hearing or 
to hallucinating or more similar to seeing or to dreaming respectively. 
The point here is that we could just as easily have substituted the 
transcendent for a call of a bird or a woman at a window since 
experiencing something in music is not, as argued above, solely a 
matter of what experiencing that something must be in extra-artistic 
contexts. The Degas, for instance, shows us what a woman at a 
window is like-indeed, what it would be like for us to see a woman 
at a window-without necessarily having to be the case that we are in 
fact having an experience of seeing a woman at a window. 
But a difference still remains: we are not restricted to the 
Courtauld Institute Galleries in order to see or experience a woman 
at a window whereas, as Nietzsche seems to be saying, we have no 
choice but the arts (or their "spiritualised" equivalent) as our venue 
for the metaphysical. In other words, perhaps Nietzsche intuitively 
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shied away from construing music or the so-called tragic arts in 
representational terms towards construing them in transfigurational 
terms, because their task was not somehow to symbolise or reproduce, 
mirror or imitate, illustrate or copy the metaphysical, but to constitute 
it. If that is the case, then for Nietzsche these tragic artforms embody 
or express a transcendent experience, but they do,not represent it in 
a way that may be had from some independent source. In this 
constitutive sense, music or the tragic for Nietzsche is paradoxically 
both the cause and the object of a transcendent experience other-
wise normally denied to our human, all too human experience. 
Notes 
I Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case against \%gner (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967), Section 3, p. 19. All references to this work in 
the text are to this edition, containing WaIter Kaufmann's translation of the 
revised 1874 version of The Birth of Tragedy. Also questioning the value of 
logic is Alan Watt, "Nietzsche's Productive Logic", in The Fate of the New 
Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Howard Cay gill , eds (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1993), esp. pp. 128-30. Watt postulates that Nietzsche's logic is best 
characterised as "productive", as distinct from deductive or inductive, in so 
far as it promotes the inconclusive, the undecided, and the exploratory. 
However, Watt not only draws his examples from originally unpublished 
notes, but also appears to be willing to conflate logic and rhetoric. 
2 To cite one of the earliest Anglo-American treatments, namely, A. C. 
Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 12. For a brief 
summary of Nietzsche's "linguistic" concerns, though given a pedagogic 
slant, see, e.g., D.E. Cooper, Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational 
Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 136-9. 
3 These alternatives frequently preface interpretations of Nietzsche: see, 
e.g., Hugh Tomlinson, "Nietzsche on the Edge of Town: Deleuze and 
Reflexivity", in Exceedingly Nietzsche: Aspects of Contemporary Nietzsche-Inter-
pretation, eds D.F. Krell and D.C. Wood (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 151. 
4 See, e.g., Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 25-57; M.S. Silk and J.P. Stern, Nietzsche on 
Tragedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 132-87; and 
Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Jt0ice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
pp. 187-212 respectively. 
5 A conclusion also reached, e.g., by Peter Heckman, "The Role of Music 
in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy", in The British Journal of Aesthetics, 30.4 
(October 1990), pp. 351- 60. 
6 Section I, p. 33. 
7 Section 25, pp. 143 and 144· 
19 
Literature and Aesthetics 
8 Section I, p. 33. 
9 Section I, p. 34· 
10 Section I, pp. 36 and 37. 
11 Section 2, p. 38. 
12 Section I, pp. 37 and 34. 
13 See D.M. Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, revised edition 
{London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 8-14 arguing for five senses of metaphysical 
analogy. 
14 Section 2, p. 38. 
15 Section 2, p. 38, Section 4, pp. 45 & 46. 
16 Section 2, p. 38, Section 4, p. 46 & Section 6, p. 55. 
17 Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of:As If:· A System of the Theoretical, Practical 
and Religious Fictions of Mankind, sixth edition, trans. C.K. Ogden 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1924), pp. 85-90. 
18 See T.S. Champlin, "Tendencies", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
n.s., 91, paper 7 (28 January 1991), pp. II9-33, to whom this and the 
following paragraph are indebted. 
19 Section 2, p. 38. 
20 Section 2, p. 39. 
21 Section 2, p. 39. 
22 Section 2, pp. 39-40. 
23 Section 2, _po 40. 
24 Section 2, p. 40. 
25 Following Heckman, "Role of Music", pp. 156-7, but without reference to 
Nietzsche's alleged adherence to Schopenhauer at this juncture. 
26 Section 4, p. 46. 
27 Section 16, p. 103. 
28 Section 5, p. 49· 
29 Section 5, P' 49· 
30 Section 5, p. 50. 
31 Section 5, p. 50. 
32 Section 5, PP' 52 & 50. 
33 Section 5, p. 52. 
34 Section 6, p. 54. 
35 Section 6, p. 54· 
36 See, e.g., Carl Dahlhaus, "The Twofold Truth in Wagner's Aesthetics: 
Nietzsche's Fragment 'On Music and Words"', in Between Romanticism and 
Modernism: Four Studies in the Music of the Later Nineteenth Century, trans. 
Mary Whittall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 19-39 
and K.M. Higgins, "Nietzsche on Music", in Journal of the History of Ideas, 
20 
R.A. Goodrich 
47·4 (OctoberlDecember 1986), pp. 663-72 . 
37 Conveniently summarised by John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 78-86. 
38 See, here, the strictures developed in a different context by F.N. Sibley, 
"Making Music One's Own," in The Interpreiation of Music: Philosophical 
Essays, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon Press"1993), pp. 165-76. 
39 Section 8, p. 65· 
40 Section 8, p. 64. 
41 Section 8, p. 64. 
42 Section 8, p. 64. 
43 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 
529, which he more extensively documents in "Making Life Worth Living: 
Nietzsche on Art in The Birth of Tragedy", in Making Sense of Nietzsche: 
Reflections Timely and Untimely (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 
pp. 129-52. For a critical appraisal of Nietzsche's mooted extension of 
artistic transformation to all activities, see, e.g., Danto, Nietzsche as 
Philosopher, pp. 44-7. 
44 Section 8, p. 64· 
45 Section 24, p. 140 . 
46 Section 2, p. 38 & Section 7, p. 60. 
47 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, second edition, ed. and 
trans. Paul Guyer and A.W Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), B.I25ff. (pp. 224f£) and B.765 & 813ff. (pp. 642 & 666f£), 
where he characterises the nature of transcendental arguments and 
proofs in terms of possible, systematically coherent experience; succinctly 
reviewed by D.A. Rohatyn, "What are Kant's 'Presuppositions'?" in Journal 
of the British Society for Phenomenology, 11.3 (October 1980), pp. 283-9. 
48 See T. J. Diffey, '~rt and the Transcendent", in The British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 34.4 (October 1994), pp. 326-36, to whom this and the 
following paragraphs are indebted. Whether Nietzsche's claims about 
the transcendent might be translatable in terms of knowledge by 
acquaintance would take us beyond the space allocated for this paper 
since it would force us to question which of several attempts to elucidate 
it by the early Russell could apply, let alone apply successfully: see, e.g., 
B.A.W. Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by 
Description", in Mysticism and Logic and other essays (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 197-218 and "Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description", in The Problems of Philosophy (London: 
Williams & Norgate, 1912), pp. 72-92. 
49 Section 13, p. 87· 
50 Book X, 595b-602b. 
21 
